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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. NELSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PERRY A. PETERSON, M.D., and 
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DEVELOP-
MENT CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, dba VALLEY WEST 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 13803 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant does not dispute the familiar rules governing 
plaintiff's burden of proof in medical malpractice cases. See 
e.g. Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663 (1967); 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959); Huggins 
v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957); Anderson v. Nixon, 
104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 
83 P.2d 1021 (1938). See also Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962). 
Appellant contends, however, that her burden of proof was met at 
trial in that she established, by expert medical testimony, the 
prevailing standard of care in the community, the deviation from 
that standard, and that her injuries were probably caused by 
said deviation. Appellant further contends, that even when 
the record is read in a light most favorable to the prevailing 
parties below as required on appellate review, Paull v. Zions 
First National Bank, 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966), it 
is apparent that the jury's verdict of no cause of action is 
not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant therefore 
affirms the arguments presented in her first brief and in reply 
to new matter set forth in respondents' briefs argues as follows: 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT A 
VAGINAL EXAMINATION WAS NOT 
NECESSARY UNDER THE PARTICULAR 
FACTS OF THIS CASE IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD. 
Reply to Respondents' Point I. Defendant hospital's 
answer to plaintiff's charge that it breached the prevailing 
standard of care by not performing a vaginal examination upon 
admission reads as follows: 
While Dr. Harris testified that it was the 
standard of care in this community to perform 
a vaginal examination upon admission, he 
admitted on cross-examination that such was 
not necessary in this case, since the plaintiff 
had had a vaginal examination at her doctor's 
office immediately before her admission to the 
-2-
hospital, L<. JUtf.; irier 01 Respuiiaenl xio.-
 :;iu. .. 
-t In c, . :*!«.-, Brief of Respondent Physician at 9. 
i-r . i;aii J ;' dCi -^.i i ; uS Limoiij. n tou... pc;;o. '. - . . . 
?;o.-.-, ::" the patient has come to the hospital 
directly from the doctor's office, and he has 
performed an examination of her, there would be 
no need for an immediate examination, would there? 
Unless the membranes nac rupiurea. 
v< 
Ana the hospital knew or had reason to believe 
of "that? 
•es. ('. ^OR-r-c.) (Emphasis added.) 
Respond-. . ^ . : .- • : 
Dr. Peterson testified that ^n the absence of 
""sections from, the attending physician, it 
a matter of judgment upon the part of the 
:. . 'ses as to whether a vaginal exaainaticn 
should be done upon admission to the hospital, 
and that under the facts of this case, a vacinal 
examination was not indicated. (R. 245-24 , V, *'\ 
396, 3S~ T,ric: of Rcr^cr/^r/ Ilc^.r.il o 
Even assumin-: *h l l he '"tin <*"* of \-rpf appa *~ent 1 y 
p e c u l i a r t o V . d l O v „ L S I : . . . . , > L.- . ,
 r C . : _ - . O „ . . • .* : :-.i 
whether a vaginal examination should oa oor'ormed u' •. \ admission 
t: is important t determine what ia(iu>!^ .^  ,± invoio : •_ ^ loiving 
at that judgment. These factors were defined by Dr. Peterson 
as : c i^.v'S : 
(> ( i riaht a,a, vou indicated, *" believe. Lint it 
we.ild be a matter of judgment on the part of the 
nursing personnel as to whether a vaginal examina-
tion v;as indicated". 
t. i V , I ' I 1 "> I I h ' . i i V't » u . 
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A, The answer is yes. 
Q. And one of the considerations as to whether or not 
a vaginal examination would be indicated or desirable 
would be whether or not the patient was complaining 
of labor pains, would it not? 
A. That is true. 
n# if the patient was having labor pains, that would 
be a consideration pointing to a vaginal examination? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if they were hard and frequent that would be 
a further indication? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. On the contrary, if the patient has no such pains 
or complaints that would be an indication that one 
may not be necessary at this time? 
A. That is true. 
* • « • 
Q. Likewise, if the patient reports that the bag of 
waters has ruptured that might be an indication for 
a vaginal examination? 
A. Yes, it would. 
Q. Or if it occurred in the presence of hospital 
personnel, that might be an indication. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But if the hospital personnel were not aware of it, 
that would be another consideration that might 
indicate that a vaginal examination was not necessary? 
A. Yes, that is true. (R. 276-77.) 
Although plaintiff was not experiencing labor pains when 
she entered the hospital, it remains uncontroverted that none of 
the nurses even bothered to inquire upon admission whether 
plaintiff's water had broken. (R. 347, 351, 427.) When 
plaintiff was finally asked the question by Dr. Peterson after 
-4-
he discovered the prolapsed cord, she reported that the membranes 
had ruptured prior to admission* (R. 281, 392, 394, 427-28.) 
This statement formed the basis for several entries to that effect 
in the hospital records. (R. 393-95, 427-28.) 
At the conclusion of Dr. Harris1 testimony, the trial 
iudge asked him specifically whether the hospital personnel 
should have inquired if plaintiff's water had broken: 
THE COURT: One other question. Can you state 
whether or not the standard of practice in the 
community at that time would have required the 
hospital people to make inquiry of the patient 
upon her admission as to whether the water had 
broken. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, it would be the standard of 
practice to inquire. (R. 318.) 
It is apparent and uncontroverted, that the hospital 
personnel violated the standard of practice in the community by 
not inquiring of plaintiff whether her water had broken upon 
her admission. It is no answer to say that such a question may 
not have elicited any reliable information when, according to 
defendants1 own testimony, the plaintiff's answer to the question 
a few hours after admission was that her water had broken prior 
to entering the hospital. (R. 281, 392, 394, 427-28.) Since, 
according to Dr. Peterson's own testimony, one of the factors 
to be considered in deciding whether to perform a vaginal 
examination on admission is whether a patient's water has broken 
(R. 276-77), it follows that the hospital personnel breached their 
duty of care in negligently failing to even attempt to become 
aware of this factor before deciding against a vaginal examina-
-5-
tion. How then can it be argued (Brief of Respondent Hospital 
at 10) that under the facts a vaginal examination was not indicated 
when the hospital breached its duty to even attempt to ascertain 
the critical facts needed to arrive at that judgment? 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS1 CONTENTION THAT 
APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION 
WAS MERELY SPECULATIVE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD IN ITS 
ENTIRETY. 
Further Reply to Respondents1 Point I. Under direct 
examination regarding the issue of proximate cause, plaintiff's 
medical expert Dr. John Harris, testified as follows: 
Q. Based on what you found from the file, from your 
review of the file, do you have an opinion as to 
whether or not that — and this is within the 
bounds of reasonable medical probability, I am not 
— I will ask you to give me your opinion within 
that area. If you have an opinion. Do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not had there been a 
vaginal examination of Mrs. Nelson performed on 
September the 2nd of 1971, at the time she was 
admitted to the Valley West Hospital, as to whether 
or not the cord would have been determined, the 
prolapsed cord would have been determinable at this 
time? 
A. I think it would have been likely. 
Q. Now, Doctor, I'd like you to assume some facts in — 
strike that. Let me ask one other question here. 
In the event, Doctor, that the cord had been 
examined, had been discovered, the prolapsed cord 
had been discovered upon admission to the hospital, 
admission of Mrs. Nelson to the hospital, what 
would the proper procedure have been? 
A. The nurse — It would have been possible for the 
nurse to push up on the baby's head, relieving the 
pressure from this cord. The other possibility 
would have been to place the patient in a head-down 
position which would have helped to release the 
-6-
pressure also. Also to notify the physician of the 
state of affairs so that he could come to the hospital. 
Q. Now, with the patient in that position and with 
those procedures followed, do you have an opinion 
as to how long this child, within the bounds of 
reasonable medical certainty, how long this unborn 
child could have lived and existed under those 
circumstances? 
MR. SNOW: You can state that yes or no, Doctor, 
as to whether you have an opinion. 
THE WITNESS: I have an opinion. 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) And would you tell us what it is? 
A. Had the cord been — 
MR SNOW: Just a moment, please. I am going to 
object to that. As I understand the foundation 
questions, he was asked whether the prolapsed cord 
could have been discovered if there had been an 
examination upon her admission. And then if it 
had been discovered, the nurse could have either 
pushed up on the head, could have placed the patient 
in the head-down position and could have called 
the doctor. And I now understand this question is, 
if those things had occurred, none of which are in 
evidence, if those things had occurred, how long 
would the child have lived and I object on the 
ground there is no foundation in evidence to support 
the question. There is no indication of the extent 
of the compression or the period of time it had 
already been present. There is no evidence upon 
which the doctor could do other than speculate 
concerning the effect of the nurse pushing up on the 
head or the patient going into the position that has 
been described. And all of this is, therefore, so 
speculative that the opinion would have no founda-
tion or — would in fact not be a competent expression. 
THE COURT: He has asked him on the basis of 
reasonable medical certainty and if he has an 
opinion on that basis, I will let him state it. 
THE WITNESS: The fetal heart was taken on admission. 
It was normal. So we have some reason to believe 
that the compression was not severe at that time. 
Therefore, with a palpating cord and a normal fetal 
tone rate, it is possible to divert the baby and lift 
it off the cord and have a physician arrive at a 
-7-
hospital and do a Caesarean section perhaps an 
hour later, (R. 301-03.) (Emphasis added.) 
Dr. Harris further stated under cross-examination that "Perhaps 
75 percent" of the infants suffering from a prolapsed umbilical 
cord are saved. (R. 3 09.) 
Although under further cross examination, Dr. Harris 
stated that it was "speculative" whether the baby could have been 
saved assuming the prolapsed cord had been discovered upon 
admission, (R. 312-13), under recross-examination he subse-
quently clarified what he meant by the word "speculative." 
Q. Dr. Harris, what is the basis of your statistical 
comment about 7 5 percent of the infants or fetuses 
in which the cord is prolapsed have been saved? Is 
there some study of that? 
A. The vast majority of studies have been within the 
hospital, patients. Many occur outside prior to 
the arrival at the hospital of the patient. So 
it must be somewhat speculative, based on in-hospi-
tal and out-hospital prolapse. 
Q. But if you confine it to what you have used here 
in this hospital record and the basis for much of 
your testimony, that is, that your opinion that it 
occurred on the way to the hospital, there isn't 
any study that would suggest anywhere near 75 per-
cent of those particular kinds are saved, is there? 
A. That anywhere near 75 percent of what? 
Q. Are saved of those particular kinds? 
A. The prolapse occurring out of the hospital, 
probably less that 7 5 would be saved. 
Q. Significantly less, isn't that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you say that in response to a question by 
one of these gentlemen, in the last few months 
that you had an opinion concerning the ability of 
the hospital people to save the infantfs or fetus1 
-8-
life if they had examined the patient upon arrival 
at the hospital and had discovered the prolapsed 
cord, that assumes, does it not, that the cord has 
not been prolapsed and compressed for sufficient 
period of time to have killed the fetus? 
A. We know the fetal heart was present on admission. 
(R. 314-15.) (Emphasis added.) 
It seems clear from the above explanation, that the 
75 percent figure used by Dr. Harris was based primarily on 
cases of prolapse occuring within the hospital. In the instant 
case, however, even though the medical expert testified that 
in his opinion the prolapse occurred outside the hospital, 
(R. 309) , it is uncontroverted that normal fetal heart tones 
were present on admission indicating that "compression was not 
severe at this time." (R. 303). It follows that the instant 
case can be viewed as an "in hospital" situation for purposes 
of applying the 75 percent successful remedial treatment figure. 
According to the rule set forth in the case of 
Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943), 
in medical malpractice actions it is unnecessary that proxi-
mate cause be proved with exactitude; substantial evidence to 
support judgment is sufficient. And as this court stated in 
the case of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 
(1954) , the greater weight of the evidence means "such degree 
of proof that the greater probability of truth lies therein." 
Id. at 988. Plaintiff met this burden on the causation issue 
by establishing on the basis of reasonable medical certainty 
that her injuries were caused by the claimed deviation from 
the prevailing standard of medical care in the community. 
-9-
CONCLUSION 
When the record is viewed in its entirety, it is 
clear that plaintiff met her burden of proof by establishing 
the prevailing standard of care in the community, the deviation 
from that standard, and that her injuries were probably caused 
by said deviation. This burden was met by presenting substantial 
evidence through the use of expert medical testimony on each of 
the disputed issues in plaintifffs prima facie case. The jury's 
verdict of no cause of action in the negligence suit runs 
counter to this substantial evidence and should therefore be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
G. Richard Hill 
HANSEN & ORTON 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2020 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Raymond A. Hintze 
Suite #273, Cottonwood Mall 
4835 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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